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Abstract 
     The introduction of a performance-based funding mechanism by Alberta's provincial 
government alters the public definition of "educational quality" and fully shifts the 
responsibility for declining educational quality from the provincial government onto 
institutions. This article outlines the process by which the provincial government has 
compelled institutions to accept this redefinition and transfer despite the substantial  loss of
institutional autonomy it entails. The implications of this change are explored  and possible
reasons are suggested. 
  
 Introduction 
     The introduction of performance indicators (PIs) in Alberta's performance-based  funding
mechanism has changed the definition of education quality and fully shifted the 
responsibility for providing a high-quality post-secondary education onto institutions.  This
ignores the pivotal role government funding plays in maintaining educational  quality. One
result of this process is a significant loss of institutional autonomy. A  second result has
been the imposition of a market model on education that shifts  responsibility for education
from government to individuals. 
 
 Background
    Alberta's public service has recently undergone a massive downsizing as the provincial 
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government has eliminated its deficit through reductions in public spending. The decline  in
government funding to the post-secondary education (PSE) system totaled 21%  between
1994 and 1997 (AECD, 1994). When coupled with spiraling enrollments and  stagnant
provincial funding, Alberta's 21 public colleges, universities and technical  institutes have
seen per-student, constant-dollar funding fall from $6165 in 1980/81 to  $3267 in 1996/97--a
reduction of 47% in 17 years. Funding and enrollment projections  through 2005 suggests
this pattern will hold (AAE, 1992; Treasury, 1997). 
     This trend in post-secondary funding has occurred worldwide and concurrently with the 
contraction of the welfare state. This suggests a return to the classically liberal approach  to
government where liberty is defined as "freedom from restraint" in contrast to the  reform
liberal definition of liberty as the "freedom to act" (Gibbins and Youngman, 1996).  This
shift has been caused (or, alternately, legitimized) by large government deficits and  debts. 
  
  Debt and deficit; revenue and expenses 
     Upon election in 1993, Alberta's government faced a substantial deficit and growing 
debt--the legacy a decade of upheaval in oil and gas prices--and set about attempting  to
reduce government expenditures. Government rhetoric about spiraling public-sector  costs as
the prime cause of both the debt and deficit, according to Kevin Taft, is largely  inaccurate:
overall government spending had been declining since 1986.
 "…(former premier Don) Getty's government had kept this decline fairly quiet, still 
wanting Albertans to believe they were getting 'the best' from their province, an 
expectation strongly engendered during the Lougheed years. As a result, the public 
was still under the misconception that Alberta spent far more than other provinces."
     The public belief that programs were still rich, reinforced by a strong public  opposition
to tax increases left open a whole new strategy for (current) Premier  (Ralph) Klein's
incoming government. He and his ministers strongly reinforced the  mistaken perception that
spending was out of control and argued vigorously to cut  expenditures (Taft, 1997, p. 12). 
Between 1986 and 1992, Getty's cuts saw government spending fall  by 15% (adjusted  for
inflation) and, by fiscal 1991/92, Alberta spent $4593 per capita on public services  as
compared to the Canadian average of $4758 (McMillian and Warrack, 1995). Yet, in  June
1994, Klein told the Edmonton Journal, "When our government took over a year and  a half
ago, we saw uncontrolled spending" (Taft, 1997, p. 25). 
    Cooper and Neu (1995) suggest that the real reason that expenditures had outstripped 
revenues during the Getty years was that the government was not only feeling the effects  of
the low resource prices, but also the effects of granting the oil-and-gas lobby tax  breaks as
oil prices fell. This means that the government received lower royalties because  of lower
prices and also absorbed a portion of the oil-and-gas companies' losses (due to  these same
lower prices) by accepting a lesser percentage of the sale price in royalties. 
    McMillian and Warrack (1995) note that the government had three way to compensate 
for its deficit: (a) reducing public expenditures, (b) increasing revenues or (c) a  combination
of reducing expenses and increasing revenue. The decision to concentrate on  the expense
side of the government balance sheet (to preserve the Alberta Advantage of  low taxes) was
a conscious decision (as opposed to being the necessity Klein often  portrays it as) and
reflects the political difficulty of selling tax increases to Albertans  used to low taxes. 
  
The Alberta Advantage: Rhetoric or Reality? 
    The Alberta Advantage is premised on "a powerful combination of low taxes, fiscally 
responsible government, abundant natural resources and a well-educated workforce"  (Klein,
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1996). The Klein government's belief that low taxes stimulate business and  consumer
spending explains why it has focused solely on reducing expenditures to  balance the budget
rather than also attempting to increase revenues by raising taxes. 
    The dogmatic belief that low taxes attract investment in Alberta by companies runs 
contrary to conventional approaches to estimating the profitability of locating  businesses in
a region (Drugge, 1995). The corporate sector estimates profitability based  upon the
possibility of high-volume sales combined with access to low-cost, high-quality  inputs and
inexpensive transportation. Further, evidence gathered over the past 15 years  clearly
demonstrates that a low-tax approach to economic development (the basis of the  Alberta
Advantage) has not been successful in Alberta. 
    McMillian and Warrack (1995) note that Alberta's taxes were lower than any other 
province prior to Klein's election (approximately 75% of the Canadian average) and had 
been kept this low by the presence of natural resources revenues for the past decades.  (In
1993/94, Alberta received approximately 40.3 per cent of its revenue from  individual and
corporate taxes while the Canadian average was 61.3 per cent. The  difference was largely
made up of the taxes assessed on the extraction of natural  resources.) If low taxes do
stimulate economic growth in Alberta, there should be  evidence in Alberta's growth through
the 1980s. 
    Between 1981 and 1993, Alberta's average annual growth in retail sales was 0.3 per  cent,
substantially lower than that of higher-tax British Columbia (1.3 per cent) and lower  than
the Canadian average of 0.7 per cent (Drugge, 1995). Average annual real business 
investment in Alberta during this period (investment in plants, machinery and  equipment)
was -3.0 per cent, while in British Columbia it was 1.4  per cent and the  Canadian average
was 2.9 percent. The average annual real growth rate in Alberta from  1981 to 1993 was 0.6
per cent. British Columbia had a 2.9 per cent growth rate and the  Canadian average was 2.5
per cent. 
    What this analysis demonstrates is that Alberta's low-tax strategy has been  unsuccessful
in stimulating growth. This is because Alberta's economy is largely tied to  the natural
resources market and a low-tax strategy lacks the power to successfully  counter the
fluctuations in the resource market. The Alberta Advantage does not work in  Alberta. 
    In 1990/91, Alberta personal and corporate taxes equaled $2885 per capita (McMillian 
and Warrack, 1995). The Canadian average was $3681. Additionally, Alberta has a tax 
capacity approximately 33 per cent greater than the Canadian average, meaning having 
taxes comparable to the rest of Canada would have actually netted the government  $4331.
Given that low taxes have little ability to stimulate growth in a resource- dominated
economy, raising them towards the Canadian average in conjunction with  reductions in
public spending provides a balanced solution to the revenue problem  without unduly
burdening taxpayers. This solution has been successfully implemented in  the neighboring
province of Saskatchewan. 
    Further, by adjusting both revenues and expenditures, Alberta could have maintained its 
investment in human capital that business owners rank as vastly more important in  business
success than low taxes. The assault on Alberta's investment in
"human capital negatively affects precisely those features such as quality of labour 
and management noted as the key resources of economic success in the small 
business surveys cited above. These expenditure reductions must therefore raise 
serious questions about the underlying logic of the government's policies." (Drugge, 
1995, p. 189).
     The importance of resource revenue in Alberta's budget further suggests that spending on 
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public programs wasn't the source of the deficit but that low tax revenues were. And 
attempting to control the deficit solely by cutting public-sector spending in order to avoid 
tax increases makes no sense. That the government did not take note of the economic 
lessons of the Getty years (because of its fixation on the politically saleable Alberta 
Advantage) and drastically down-sized the public sector at the expense of the  province's
economic future, suggests either incompetence or priorities other than ensuring  the
economic success of every Albertan through access to public services like post- secondary
education. 
  
 Per-student funding and the changing role of government 
    Returning to the earlier discussion of the effect of ideological change on the degree of 
responsibility assumed by society for providing a post-secondary education system, the 
disaggregation of responsibility for the reform liberalist "freedom to act" can be seen in  the
government's human resource strategy, People and Prosperity:
Continuous learning and the updating of skills is a shared responsibility. The  primary
onus is on individual Albertans, but strategies are needed to help them  access learning
opportunities and obtain the skills and knowledge they need to be  successful. Student
assistance ensures that financial barriers do not act as a  deterrent to Albertans
pursuing adult learning. Alberta's schools, universities,  colleges and technical
institutes play a key role in our human-resource strategy.  Schools are responsible for
providing education programs that develop individual  potential and prepare young
Albertans for daily living, the world of work and  lifelong learning. Adult learning
institutions have a responsibility to provide high- quality, accessible learning
opportunities to people who are preparing for careers  and to those who wish to update
their skills. Employers, employee groups and  unions have a responsibility to facilitate
learning opportunities in the workplace  (Government of Alberta, 1997a, p. 10).
     Notably absent is the government's share of responsibility for continuous learning and 
the updating of skills. Implicitly, this excerpt suggests that the government is responsible 
for providing student assistance to ensure accessibility, however, student assistance is 
increasingly in the form of loans (which are now administered by banks) thus  accessibility
is being bought by Albertans at the cost of assuming large personal debts. It  could also be
argued that the government is implicitly agreeing to fund schools and  adult-learning
institutions. But, as noted above, per-student government grants have  been in a period of
long-term and significant decline. 
    Educational quality and the implications of funding reductions While defining quality is
difficult, Harvey and Green (1993) outline five broad  approaches to the concept:
1.   The classical view of quality as transformation sees it in terms of change from
one  state to another (i.e. a high-quality PSE would transform a student into a 
different person). 
2.   The exceptional perspective sees quality a something special and is closely 
associated with the idea of excellence attainable by very few; 
3.   Quality as perfection equates quality with a consistent or flawless outcome; 
4.   The fitness for purpose approach defines quality as meeting the needs of the 
customer or end-user; and 
5.   Quality as value for money emphasizes quality as the return on investment.
    The traditional view of quality (i.e. the transformative ability of education) is most 
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consistent with Canadian higher education. The purpose higher education has been to 
develop students' knowledge, skills, and attitudes and the process (involving  introspection,
synthesis and integration) has varied according to the experience,  aptitude and motivation
of the students. This differs from market-based concepts of  quality in that something is
being done to the consumer as opposed to something being  done for the consumer. By
changing the consumer (and, presumably, the consumer's  references) during the process,
higher education violates the assumption of pre-existent  purpose necessitated by the
rationality inherent in market models of decision-making  (Harvey and Green, 1993; Stone,
1988; March, 1976; March and Olsen, 1976). 
    With the classical definition of quality in mind, there are three preconditions for a
high-quality post-secondary education system:
a)   PSE must be accessible for students such that levels of tuition and net debt at 
graduation do not deter students from pursuing education and training according  to
their aptitude. 
b).  Public colleges, universities and technical institutions must be able to attract and 
retain high-quality teachers and researchers. 
c)   Institutions must be able to provide adequate infrastructure, including an 
appropriate physical plant and modern equipment and information resources for 
students.
     Declining per-student funding has impaired the ability of Alberta's PSE system to provide
a high-quality education. 
  
 Accessibility 
     In constant 1995 dollars, tuition and fees at The University of Calgary (one of Alberta's 
three research-focused universities) will have increased from $1326 in 1989 to $3837 in 
1999 (UCSU, 1996). This 189% increase is mirrored at the Universities of Alberta and 
Lethbridge. College and technical-institute students have seen similar changes. For 
example, annual tuition at Grant MacEwan Community College rose 174% between 1989 
and 1997, jumping from just over $500 to nearly $1700 while Red Deer College students 
will have seen tuition jump by 227% between 1989 and 1998. 
    Net student debt at graduation is also increasing with average student debt at  graduation
(of those students with loans) rising from $6076 in 1987 to $11,604 in 1995  (AAE, 1990;
UCSU, 1996). University-student debt in 1996 averaged $15,518 while  college students
averaged $9172 and technical-institute students averaged $8752  (AECD, 1997e). 
    Statistics Canada data on university tuition and participation rates suggests that costs 
associated with post-secondary education have risen faster than the resources available  to
students (Little, 1997). From 1989 to 1994, the percentage of an average family's  income
that an average tuition assessment comprised rose from 3.1% to 4.9%.  Nationally, between
1984 and 1995, tuition increased (in real dollars) by 75% while  Canada Student Loan
allotments increased by only 55%. The declining rates of  employment of 20- to 24-year-olds
(73% 1989, 65% in 1994) and stagnant wage levels  mean that students may be leery of
assuming long-term debt that they will be unable to  manage upon graduation. For example,
in 1993/94, 23% of students owing money of  loans defaulted (Calgary Herald, 1994). 
    Many students groups suggest that high levels of tuition and debt are barriers to 
accessibility (ACTISEC, 1997). Their contention may have some statistical support in a 
recent Statistics Canada report that notes a decline in overall enrollment levels after  1993.
While the percentage of 19- to 24-year-olds enrolled has continued to increase,  this increase
has slowed significantly (Little, 1997). A survey of high -school graduates  in Alberta noted
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that 38% of graduates not planning on pursuing a post-secondary  education were making
that choice for financial reasons while 64% of respondents  agreed that post-secondary
education was getting too expensive (Krahn and Lowe,  1997). 
  
  High-Quality Teachers and Researchers 
    Alberta's colleges, universities and technical institutes will need to replace  approximately
40% of their faculty over the next 10 years due to an uneven age  distribution (AAS:UA,
1995). Low salaries as compared to other provinces and  industries combined with poor
working conditions will make this a challenging task. 
    In a 1985/86 ranking of 18 Canadian universities, mean salaries at the Universities of 
Alberta and Calgary placed second and fourth, respectively. By 1995/96, the U of A  had
slipped to 16th place while the U of C  occupied 17th (Robb, 1997).  Corrected for 
inflation, salaries at the U of A have actually declined slightly in the same time-frame 
(AAS:UA, 1996).  The wage gap between positions in Alberta and positions in British 
Columbia and Ontario means that, assuming current conditions hold, faculty in Alberta  earn
nearly $200,000 less over the course of their life-time (CAUT, 1996). While wages  for
faculty across the country have stagnated or declined, Alberta's decline has been  relatively
more rapid. This has been exacerbated by declining infrastructure (see below). 
    College and technical-institute faculty face a similar wage-gap with their counterparts in 
Ontario and British Columbia earning 20-25% more at each step of the salary grid  (personal
communication, Evelyn Wieland, 25 June 1997; personal communication,  David Piasta, 4
June 1997). Colleges and technical-institutes also face substantial  competition from other
industries for the professionals who are potential faculty.  Instructors at the Northern Alberta
Institute of Technology can expect to make $40,000  per year but can command salaries of
up to $80,000 in high-demand industries (Avery,  1997). This wage disparity resulted in, for
example, the loss of the entire faculty  complement in the province's only Crane and Hoist
program to industry during the  summer of 1997 (personal communication, Terry Sway, 13
September 1997). 
    Faculty throughout Alberta are also facing increasing workloads because of rising 
teacher-to-student ratios. At the University of Alberta, the teacher-to-student ratio  increased
by 20% between 1991 and 1995 (AAS:UA, 1996). At the Southern Alberta  Institute of
Technology, the ratio jumped by 88% between 1992 and 1995 (SAIT, 1996). 
    In addition to generating greater workloads, rising faculty-to-student ratios decreases  the
quality of education provided. Research in Canadian universities suggests that  classroom
technique is the key determinant of educational outcomes (Gilbert, 1995). This  ignores that
classroom technique is largely determined by class size: for example, it is  easier to
encourage discussion and interaction in a class of 30 than in a class of 100.   Besides forcing
changes to less effective instructional techniques, increasing class sizes  alters evaluation
from written exams (that test students' ability to apply their  knowledge and skills to novel
problems) to multiple-choice tests (that emphasize the  ability to associate concepts and
commit information to short-term memory). 
  
  Infrastructure 
    In 1993, the Ministry of Advanced Education and Career Development estimated the 
deferred infrastructure investment on its $4 billion capital stock to be approximately  $400
million (AECD, 1993). Deferred investment in infrastructure encompasses every  aspect of
institutional infrastructure from building maintenance and replacement to  renewing library
and equipment stocks. This issue (despite a recent $105 million  injection into the system by
the government over three years) remains significant and  impacts student learning and
faculty recruitment (AECD, 1997a). 
7 of 15
 
  Performance-Based Funding in Alberta's PSE System
    As part of the provincial government's 1994 White Paper on PSE, the government 
committed the Ministry to develop a reporting framework that assessed the outcomes of 
PSE in an effort to improve the accountability of the system for the funding it received.  This
was tied to a commitment to develop a performance-based funding mechanism   designed to
"reward performance and productivity in publicly supported post- secondary education"
(AECD, 1994, p. 15). By late 1996, the goals for the funding  mechanism had become "to
reward performance and promote excellence" (AECD, 1996,  p. 3) 
    While a substantial number of measures of accountability existed within the system  prior
to 1994, they largely focused on inputs and process (AECD, 1995). Specific  criticisms of
then-existing measures of accountability included:
 a)   a lack of systematic use; 
 b)   inadequate information provision to prospective students about educational 
outcomes; 
 c)   not providing basic information, such as cost information, at the program level; 
and 
 d)   inconsistent inter-institutional data definitions impeding comparisons.
    Institutional consultations developed a series of 76 of Performance Indicators (PIs) to 
meet the requirements of the accountability framework. Nine of these indicators are 
considered Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and are utilized in a performance-based 
funding mechanism (four indicators apply only to universities' research mandate) that  allots
each institution an additional 1-2.5% of its operating grant based on its KPI  scores (AECD,
1996). 
  
  Alberta performance-based funding mechanism 
    Alberta's performance-based funding mechanism (PBFM) takes institutional  performance
on each of a series of performance indicators and compares it to  benchmarks. Points are
awarded to an institution for its performance on each indicator,  the overall institutional
score is tallied and additional funding is awarded based on an  institution's ranking against
all other institutions' scores. 
    Using the enrollment indicator as an example, urban institutions that saw enrollment fall 
by more than -2% received zero points. Enrollment changes between -2% and 0%  received
20 points. Enrollment increases between 0% and 4% received 25 points and  enrollment
increases greater than 4% garnered a full 30 points. Each institutions' score  on the
enrollment indicator would be added to its scores on the other indicators to  create an overall
assessment of performance that would then be compared against the  scores of other
institutions. 
    The nine indicators used fell into four categories: responsiveness, accessibility, 
affordability and (for universities only) research excellence (AECD, 1997b). What  follows
is a brief explanation of each group of indicators. 
 
 Responsiveness
     The responsiveness of the system to changing economic, social and cultural
needs is  measured by two indicators: the employment rates of graduates and
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graduates'  satisfaction with their program.
  Accessibility
     The indicator measuring accessibility focuses on institutions' ability to
maintain and  improve the enrollment levels. This indicator is a near-perfect
(.95) predictor of overall  KPI performance thus generates immense pressure for
institutions to further increase  enrollment.
 Affordability
     The two indicators measuring affordability examine the ability of institutions
to  minimize administrative costs and generate revenue from sources other than
tuition from  credit programs and government grants. No measure of
affordability to learners is made.
  Research excellence
     Four indicators measure the performance of Alberta's three research-focused 
universities. Institutions' national peer-group ranking per full-time faculty
member in  terms of council monetary awards, citations per research
publication, and community  and industrial funding  are measured, as well as
sponsored revenues as a percentage of  government operating grants.
 
  Quality in Alberta's PSE System
    Alberta's performance-based funding mechanism, with its mandate to "encourage and 
reward excellence", both redefines the public's notion of high-quality education and  shifts
the full responsibility for providing it on to individual institutions (AECD, 1996,  p. 1).
   Redefining Quality 
     Performance indicators draw on an industrial metaphor of production and focus on 
input-out analysis (Emberley, 1996). This approach assumes that (1) inputs (e.g. iron,  wood,
etc.) are uniform and passive and (2) outputs (e.g. beams, tables, etc.) are  standardized
therefore making it is possible to find a best (i.e. maximally effective and  efficient) way to
transform inputs into outputs by comparing different approaches in a  purely statistical
manner. 
     If the inputs and outputs are variable then a common metric by which to measure is 
necessary for PIs to make valid comparisons between processes. For example, the 
appropriateness of sports cars and sedans for various purposes-- with inputs (i.e.  design)
and outputs (i.e. performance) that vary substantially-- can be compared based  on common
metrics like fuel efficiency (km/l) and speed-time measures (kmh). 
     Education provides neither uniform inputs and outputs nor common metrics. Students 
and instructors (i.e. inputs) are neither passive nor uniform. Graduates (i.e. outputs) are 
similarly unique in the degree to which students' knowledge, skills and attitudes can be 
developed and for what ends. The process (involving introspection, synthesis and 
integration) is similarly variable according to students' experiences, aptitudes and 
motivation and resistant to universal performance metrics (although it may be possible  to
specify measures appropriate to narrow subfields along the lines of professional  designation
exams). Attempting to make valid assessments of performance based solely  on statistical
calculation will yield a less than optimal judgment. 
     In an attempt to get around the conceptual and operational difficulties posed by 
outcomes-based performance indicators, Alberta's government has focused on the more 
easily quantifiable economic outcomes and ignored education's social and cultural 
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outcomes. This vast omission is dismissed with "the social and cultural outcomes, while 
important, have not been clearly articulated" (AECD, 1996, p. 6). Given the importance  of
the social and cultural outcomes of education, it is unlikely that the government  would fail
to articulate them without reason. One explanation for this omission is that  intractable
problems associated with developing quantitative PIs for social and cultural  outcomes.
Another explanation is that, from the perspective of the market model,  education is solely
an economic good thus measurement should focus on this aspect. By  using quantitative
measures of quality, KPIs shift the definition of quality from that of  transformative to
quality as value for money and as fitness for purpose. 
    The two outcomes of PSE in Alberta that are measured are the employment rate of 
graduates and the satisfaction of graduates with their program. The satisfaction of  graduates
with their program suggests a fitness for purpose orientation to quality: is the  customer
satisfied? Measuring employment rates is yet another measure that reflects the  fitness for
purpose approach to quality: if one goal of (most) students is to be employed  (Barnetson,
1997), the employment rates of graduates are simply a proxy measure for  customer
satisfaction. 
    It is the very idea of performance-based funding that suggests a value for money 
approach to quality. According to the government, "a performance-based funding  approach
means Albertans are getting maximum returns on their investment in post- secondary
education" (AECD, 1997c, p. 7). 
    By emphasizing customer satisfaction and the economic success of graduates, the 
government has subtly redefined the concept of quality such that it excludes traditional 
indicators of quality. The declines in accessibility, quality of faculty, and infrastructure  that
are the direct result of the long-term reduction in per-student funding from the  provincial
government are completely ignored by KPIs and the government can thus  neatly side-step
criticism (based on these grounds) that the quality of post-secondary  education has declined.
    Further, by selecting measures such as satisfaction and the employment rates of  graduates
as indicators of quality--indicators that institutions historically have done  well by--the
government creates data that justifies its substantial reduction to post- secondary funding.
The high score of almost every institution on every indicator seems to  support the
government's contention that the post-secondary system is as good (if not  better) than it was
before the 21% reduction to its funding between 1994 and 1997. 
    During the press conference announcing the performance awards, Minister for Advanced 
Education and Career Development Clint Dunford explained, "We believe that striving 
towards the goals will promote continuous improvement at individual institutions and 
throughout the system. Based on our results, thus far, excellent progress is being made" 
(AECD, 1997d, p. 2). That the lack of baseline data makes the contention of progress 
impossible to prove or disprove simply gets ignored in light of high levels of  institutional 
performance. Also glossed over is that the level of institutional performance was  guaranteed
by government selection and pretesting: the government sets the levels of  performance that
are labeled as indicative of "excellence." 
  
  Off-loading Responsibility for Quality Education 
    By measuring each institution's performance on KPIs, the government subtly shifts the 
full responsibility for the provision of high-quality education onto the institution itself. 
Institutions are measured on their ability to turn out employable, satisfied graduates in 
increasing numbers. The nature of the measurement attributes the responsibility for an 
institution's performance to the institution when, in reality, the ability of an institution  to
improve its performance is largely constrained by environmental factors. Continually 
shrinking per-student government funding, declining granting council budgets and limited 
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alternative revenue streams for institutions creates circumstances that impair  institutions'
ability to provide accessible programs staffed by high-quality teachers and  researchers and
supported by adequate infrastructure. 
    Again, the government neatly sidesteps criticism. Not only are institutions generally 
doing exceptional jobs according to the KPI performance evaluations, but those  institutions
that "require" improvement are assigned responsibility for it. According to  the government
brief on the KPI system, "There are areas for improvement and  institutions will be expected
to focus on those in the future" (AECD, 1997c, p. 7). 
  
   Loss of Institutional Autonomy 
    Government control of the post-secondary purse-strings is substantial and has both
created a desperate need within institutions for additional funding (by reducing annual 
operating grants by approximately $250 million between 1994 and 1997) and proffered  a
partial remedy (though the $15-million performance-funding envelope). In order for 
institutions to receive the remedy, however, they must accept both the government's 
redefinition of quality (an unprecedented infringement on institutional autonomy that   shifts
considerable indirect control over program objectives and delivery methods from 
institutions to the government) and the transfer of responsibility for declining  educational
quality from the government (that created the initial decline in quality  through long-term
budget cuts) to the institution. 
    By initially acquiescing to the government's performance-based funding mechanism, 
institutions have surrendered a substantial amount of their autonomy in exchange for the 
return of less than 5% of the funding the government removed from the system between 
1994 and 1997. Government is now free to change both the level of institutional 
performance it considers acceptable on any current indicators and introduce additional  KPIs
from the 67 other PIs it is collecting data on. This could include the introduction of  an
indicator stipulating mandatory completion rates (a KPI that was dropped from the 
performance-envelope calculation only weeks before the final tallying of institutional 
scores) that would pressure institutions to graduate students regardless of performance  and
infringe upon academic autonomy. Pressure has already been applied to faculty in  Red Deer
College's University transfer program who were told by their Board of  Governors in the
spring of 1997 to increase their completion rates (rates that were  already equivalent to those
of both of the province's major universities) or risk program  closure (personal
communication, Jim Scott, 1 June 1997) 
    This transfer of power has gone virtually unnoticed in both the media and institutions. 
For example, no concern has been raised regarding the overwhelming importance of the 
enrollment indicator on overall institutional KPI performance (as outlined above) despite 
the substantial pressure it exerts on institutions to increase enrollment without  additional
per-student funding increases to their base grant. The educational  consequences of this (e.g.
larger classes, fewer assignments and less instructor-student  contact) are substantial and
negative, however, ironically, this is considered an indicator  of quality by the
performance-funding mechanism. 
  
  Redefinition of purpose in education 
     The changes in how educational quality is defined and who is responsible for ensuring it 
created by KPIs suggests that there is a general redefinition of educational purpose 
occurring. The liberal-arts tradition that has driven post-secondary education is 
incompatible with government changes in health care, social services and other areas  where
citizens are being reframed as customers. The increase in government control over 
educational content and method of delivery facilitated by KPIs reduces the barriers the 
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government faces in imposing a market model on the PSE system. 
     If students are thought of as consumers of education, the important concept of 
entitlement is removed from the debate (personal communication, Raj Pannu, 12  September
1997). A consequence of this change is the elimination of the government's  responsibility
for providing education: education is a commodity (to be purchased by  the individual)
rather than a right (to be provided by society). 
    Cast as an economic good, education then has value only in economic terms. The most 
apparent economic outcome of increasing levels of education is increasingly favorable 
employment outcomes thus education is valued solely in terms of its return on  investment
and becomes indistinguishable from one of its outcomes: job training. As an  economic
good, there is no value placed on social or cultural outcomes; indeed, there  isn't even a
framework in which to discuss them as anything more than trivia  byproducts of a
fundamentally economic process. 
    If education is framed as job training (which emphasizes the accrued personal benefits  of
higher salaries and levels of employment and downplays the societal benefits of  higher
quality of life), responsibility for obtaining education (and overcoming the barriers  to
obtaining it) shifts onto the individual. This disaggregation of responsibility (when  carried
out across all sectors of government) creates an environment whereby  competition between
individuals replaces cooperation as the basis of society (Kohn,  1992). This approach ignores
that cooperation is the fundamental assumption of society  and that competition
disproportionately favors those with greater personal resources.  This same group is further
and differentially benefited by the tax reductions made  possible by lower government
expenditures on education and other public services  (McQuaig, 1996). 
 
  Conclusions
    The quality of education (i.e. its transformative ability) provided by Alberta's post-
secondary system is declining as a result of long-term declines in per-student government 
funding. The government's KPI-based funding mechanism changes the definition of 
education quality which obfuscates public discussion and thereby deflects criticism. At  the
same time, this mechanism off-loads the responsibility for providing a high-quality 
post-secondary education to institutions and ignores the instrumental role of government 
funding. 
    Institutions have been compelled to accept this change by the financial power of the 
government--the same power that created the initial decline in educational quality--and  as a
result have surrendered substantial institutional autonomy. The loss of institutional 
autonomy facilitates the imposition of a market model into the education sector. The  market
model sees education in terms of its economic outcomes thus redefining  education as job
training. This shifts responsibility for education from government to the  individual thereby
engendering competition between differentially advantaged  consumers. At the same time, it
trivializes debate about the social and cultural outcomes  of education because the market
model cannot accommodate serious discussion of non- quantifiable outcomes. 
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